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SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME VII FALL, 1953 NUMBER 4
THE AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS
IN FEDERAL AND TEXAS CIVIL ACTIONS
Edward C. Fritz*
T HIRTY years ago a leading scholar vigorously alerted the
Bar to its failure to protect the judicial equality of the poor.1
The American Bar Association briefly responded2 and as to free
legal aid has maintained its interest. But as to relief from pre-
payment of court costs, little has been said since 1925.' Has any-
thing been accomplished? A careful study of the pertinent law
in two jurisdictions will help answer that question.
The affidavit of inability to pay costs has replaced the "pauper's
oath" in Texas and federal courts. A century of legal develop-
ment has, in the last two decades, culminated in establishing that
a person need not be called or considered a pauper in order to
proceed in court without prepaying or securing court costs. The
development of the substantive law on what constitutes financial
inability is a signal example of how federal and state courts under
our judicial system can keep in step with economic trends without
changing fundamental objectives.
Theoretically, the principle of equal justice for all requires that
no man shall be barred from the courts because of his financial
*A. B., University of Chicago; LL.B. Southern Methodist University; member of the
Dallas and Texas Bars.
I Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1923).
2 50 A.B.A. REP. 456 (1925).
8 Notes, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 207 (1943), 48 Harv. L. Rev. 127 (1934), 9 Tulane L.
Rev. 306 (1935) ; all on tangential facets.
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position. Along with legal aid clinics, court-appointed attorneys
and the public defender system of some states, the cost inability
affidavit stands as evidence that our legal system is truly con-
cerned with the interests of all economic classes.
Since the early development of the English law, and the Roman
law before it, a person with neither property nor income has been
permitted to proceed without making deposit of court costs or
security.'
Although serious impediments soon arose to obfuscate such
proceedings,5 the free-cost privilege survived. About a hundred
years ago, when confronted with an affidavit of inability to pay
costs in a situation not covered by the Texas statute, the Supreme
Court of Texas allowed the affidavit under its general powers, "as
no man should be prevented from prosecuting a suit, seeking re-
dress for an outrage upon his person, on the ground of his
poverty." 6
The courts have consistently granted to the abject pauper the
privilege of litigating without prepayment of costs. But the courts
have long debated how to assure access to the honest affiant who
has some minimal necessary property and a living wage but in-
sufficient funds to pay court costs, without opening the door to
the unqualified.
The latest federal and Texas decisions have completed a co-
herent formulation of a standard for solving that problem under
all economic conditions. This standard is that any financially
ill-equipped citizen will be permitted to litigate without prepay-
ment of costs if prepayment would deprive him and his depend-
ents of the necessities of life.7 An analysis of the latest decisions
4 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigatian, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1923); Notes, 31
Calif. L. Rev. 207 (1943) ; 31 Harv. L. Rev. 485 (1918) ; 9 Tulane L. Rev. 306 (1935).
5 Ibid.
6 Hickey v. Rhine, 16 Tex. 577, 578 (1856).
7 Adkins v. DuPont, 335 U. S. 331 (1948) ; Wright v. Peurifoy, 260 S. W. 2d 234
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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enables a practicing attorney in either federal or Texas courts
to anticipate with considerable accuracy the results which will be
reached when this standard is applied to the facts in his case.
There is no similarity of federal and Texas practice in the
procedural law concerning affidavits of inability to pay costs. The
federal procedure has become simple, uniform, and, except for
review procedure, free of technical obstacles which might block a
consideration of the substantive merits of the affidavit. In con-
trast, for half a century there has been no progress or clarifica-
tion in the Texas procedure. Obstacles and conflicts abound. The
requirements for the affidavit and the time schedules for contest
are purposelessly different among the different courts. Review
procedure is a law unto itself - completely ignored in the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure. Major amendments to these Rules would
go far toward eliminating the procedural traps, which make pro-
ceeding on an inability affidavit something like piloting a ship
through three sets of navigation rules from Corpus Christi to
Orange.
The purposes of this article are as follows:
1. To analyze the substantive development, concurrent in
federal and Texas courts, of the formula for determining whether
an affiant is unable to make payment of or security for court
costs in civil actions. Such an analysis will enable society to
evaluate this formula, and will assist practicing attorneys and
courts in applying the formula.
2. To compare federal and Texas civil procedure in proceed-
ings on inability affidavit. Such a comparison will afford a partial
basis for the construction of a model procedure for inability affi-
davit proceedings, and will serve as a procedural guide for
practicing attorneys and judges in all courts in Texas.
3. To present a proposed revision of pertinent portions of the
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Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in order to correct defects con-
cerning procedure on inability affidavit.
THE OPERATIVE FORMULA FOR DETERMINING INABILITY
TO PAY COSTS
In early practice the English courts denied such persons as the
following from proceeding free of court costs: a person who had
an inheritance paying 40 shillings a year and who owned furni-
ture worth 10 pounds;' a woman who was able to pay as high
as 28 pounds per year house rent and who owned household
furniture worth 40 pounds.9 Even into the Nineteenth Century a
person was "dispaupered" if he was entitled to furniture worth
20 pounds,'0 or if he made 150 pounds a year,1' or if he had
been a coach builder with employees and owned a carriage, trade
implements and other goods worth 20 pounds, although he swore
he was presently "without a situation" and unable to earn suf-
ficient to support himself and his family. 2
After a vast increase in both the standard and the cost of living
through the past century, those early judicial considerations have
evolved into decisions that ownership of an automobile1 or a
3450-dollar home'4 or having an income of $320 per month 5 does
not disqualify a party to proceed without prepayment of costs if
such possessions and income are necessary to provide a living for
him and his dependents. In Texas this rule emerged suddenly, in
the last two decades, after practically no decisions had been made
8 Tunstall v. Freeney, 1 Colly. 233 n., 63 Eng. Rep. 398 n. (Rolls Ct. 1702).
9 Clarke v. Pyke, 1 Colly. 234 n., 63 Eng. Rep. 398 n. (Rolls Ct. 1706).
10 Goldsmith v. Goldsmith, 5 Hare 123, 67 Eng. Rep. 853 (Rolls Ct. 1846).
11 Boddington v. Woodley, 5 Beav. 555, 49 Eng. Rep. 693 (Rolls Ct. 1842).
12 Mather v. Shelmerdine, 7 Beav. 267, 49 Eng. Rep. 1068 (Rolls Ct. 1844).
Is Burleson v. Rawlins, 174 S. W. 2d 979 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) ; Aguirre v. Han-
ney, 107 S. W. 2d 917 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Carlisle v. Wilson, 103 S. W. 2d 434
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
14 Adkins v. DuPont, 335 U. S. 331 (1948).
15 Wright v. Peurifoy, 260 S. W. 2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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on the subject for a century of Texas history.' As of 1920, a
report of the law throughout the United States demonstrated that
no general rule had yet emerged on the subject. 7 The method
of analysis now used was devised in the federal courts in a single
decision, Adkins v. DuPont,'" and in the Texas courts in ten deci-
cisions of the past two decades.' 9
The fact that the general rule was suddenly formulated in an
era of development of pensions and social security legislation
may afford a valuable supplement to such studies of the Anglo-
American judicial system as that of Dean Levi.20 In the law of
inability to pay court costs, it is observed that the courts have
plunged suddenly into Dean Levi's second stage of the legal proc-
ess, namely, the formulation and application of a classificatory
concept.
The formula currently in use by federal and Texas courts when
determining whether an affiant is truly unable to pay costs or to
give security therefor will not be studied in detail. Following is
a list of the factors considered:
(1) Relation between income of affiant and cost of necessities
for him and his dependents.
(2) Personal property of affiant free of liens.
(3) Real property of affiant free of liens.
10 The exceptions made no effort to formulate a general rule of law, e.g.: Meyer
v. Weber, 40 S. W. 627 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897), holding that even if a man owns lots and
lands, they may be so encumbered as to be of no help in securing his court costs;
Kruegel v. Johnson, 93 S. W. 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906), holding that a man out of
work for two or three years, in bad health, devoting his time to his lawsuits instead
of to his trade where he formerly earned "as much as $5.00 per day," but owning a
home which was mortgaged, was unable to pay costs where there was no evidence
he had money to pay costs or friends willing to serve, or acceptable, as sureties; Hart
v. Wilson, 156 S. W. 520 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913), holding owner of two cows and a
yearling worth $105, not shown to be milk cows, not entitled to free appeal.
17 Note, 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920).
18 335 U. S. 331 (1948).
19 Cases cited in/ra, notes 22 through 31.
20 LEvI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LECAL R ASONiNc (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949).
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(4) Indebtedness of affiant.
(5) Health of affiant and his dependents.
(6) Effort of affiant to pay costs and to obtain security.
(7) Probable amount of costs to be incurred.
Analysis of Adkins v. DuPont21 and the ten latest pertinent
Texas cases factor by factor will disclose a well demarcated pat-
tern of law governing inability to pay costs. The factors will be
indicated by numerals in parentheses.
Adkins v. DuPont: (1) sole source of income was rentals from
parts of, affiant's home, barely sufficient to purchase necessities;
(2) no personal property; (3) home appraised at $3450; (5)
widow aged seventy-four; (7) estimated costs $4000. The court
observed that the public does not benefit if a party pays the costs
of court and then goes on charity, nor does the public benefit if
the party is forced to abandon a meritorious claim in order to
avoid the destitution which would result from paying court costs.
The court stated that absolute poverty is not a necessary qualifica-
tion for a free appeal, and vacated the trial court order denying
the appeal on inability affidavit.
Analysis will now be made of the five latest Texas decisions in
favor of the affiant.
Van Benthuysen v. Gengler:22 (1) "... all of his income was
required to pay his board and to assist in the maintenance of his
mother and father, as well as to provide his contributions for his
child's support as ordered by the court;" (2) tools of his occupa-
tion as mechanic; (3) no real property; (4) apparently no debts.
Carlisle v. Wilson:28 (1) income $17.50 to $23.00 per week and
"his entire earnings were required to support himself and his
21335 U. S. 331 (1948).
22 100 S. W. 2d 116, 117 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
23 103 S. W. 2d 434, 436 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
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family;" (2) automobile purchased for $295, with balance of
$60 against it; (3) no real property; (4) $60 debt on automo-
bile, $2.50 every two weeks on tires; (6) "be had made every
reasonable effort to procure assistance through borrowing and
otherwise, but without success;" (7) estimated cost of transcript
of testimony, $50. The court noted that affiant was suing as next
friend on behalf of his ten-year-old daughter, who had no money
or property.
Aguirre v. Hanney: (1) maximum wages $6.00 a day, and
"the whole amount of his wages was necessary to provide for his
family;" (2) Model A Ford automobile, mortgaged; (3) no real
property; (4) $2.50 per week payments on automobile; (5) wife
had recently undergone operation; (6) unable to borrow money
and had interviewed friends for the purpose of procuring their
signature on a cost bond, but they were in the same financial con-
dition as affiant; (7) district clerk offered to accept ten-dollar
court costs deposit.
Burleson v. Rawlins:25 (1) affiant's income before injury $100
per month, her husband working at a defense plant earning as
much as $36 per week, "but... [he] helped to take care of his
mother, and ... it took all they made to get along;" (2) clothing,
wrist watch, wedding ring, piano costing $400 encumbered with
a mortgage of $200, and husband had automobile encumbered
with a mortgage of $500; (3) no real property; (4) indefinite-
amount of medical bills; (5) unable to work as a result of injuries.
upon which suit was brought; (6) "they had no way of raising,
money for court costs and could not give bond as security;" (7)
bond for costs or deposit of $75 required by trial court.
Wright v. Peuri/oy:6 (1) income $320 per month, but " ...
his reasonably necessary expenses, under the circumstances pres-
ent in his case exceed that amount," for himself and four depend-
24 107 S. W. 2d 917, 918 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
25 174 S. W. 2d 979, 980 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
26 260 S. W. 2d 234, 236 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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ents; (2) five rooms of furniture against which there was a mort-
gage of $350, and affiant possessed one dollar in cash; (3) no
.real property; (4) indebtedness $71 in addition to $350 mortgage
on furniture; (5) physical and mental injuries to affiant, and
also, although not mentioned in the opinion, expensive illnesses
of wife and daughter; (6) affiant recently tried unsuccessfully to
refinance the mortgage on his furniture, to place second mortgages
against his furniture, and to obtain security for costs; he did not
know of anyone who would go on a bond for him, and, while suit
was pending in the trial court, he made cash deposits totaling $70;
(7) estimated cost of statement of facts $1200, of which trial
court ordered a cash deposit of $250. The court of civil appeals
ordered a writ of mandamus against the trial judge on its "ines-
capable conclusion, supported by the overwhelming weight of the
testimony," that affiant could not raise the $250 cash deposit.
Following are the five latest Texas decisions in favor of the
contestant.
Stark v. Dodd:27 (1) income, indefinite, including stock and an
interest in an oil company as consideration for affiant's leasing
out his house, and dividends from 82 shares of Texas Company
stock; expenses, indefinite, including the cost of educating two
children at the University of Texas; (2) aforesaid stock, cause of
action for $105,000 for the manufactured value of certain cut
timber, cause of action for $85,000 for the stumpage value of the
said timber, proceeds of sale of certain realty; (3) 686-acre tract,
large lot, 381/2-acre tract, 169-acre tract; (4) $1850 owed his
mother's estate, "several judgments for several thousand dollars;"
(6) affiant had made money deposits and had furnished a cost
bond prior to the trial; (7) balance of costs limited to indefinite
costs of appeal.
Durant v. Stone:2 (1) income, $5307.60 gross for preceding
27 76 S. W. 2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
28 97 S. W. 2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
[Vol. 7
1953] AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS 435
year, expenses not shown; (2) dairy business, 298 head of cattle
and a team of mules, family car and new car; (3) one-fourth
mineral interest in 40 acres and law suit in question for 265 acres;
(4) mortgage on all cattle; (6) no effort to pay any part of costs.
Pinchback v. Hockless:29 (1) income, indefinite, but affiant was
"practicing attorney of long experience and considerable practice,
who has his own office," and made a cash consideration of $3000
for one real estate deal; expenses, head of a family; (2) law office
equipment, automobile; (3) homestead, unmortgaged; (4) ap-
parently no indebtedness; (6) no effort to sell or encumber
property.
Stephens v. Dodson:' (1) income, $85 per month wages, $190
per year rentals from farm, $25 per month child support (in
arrears), expenses equal to income; (2) household goods; (3)
farm worth about $5000 with lien against it for $250, not affiant's
residence; (4) $250 lien on farm; (6) affiant requested four busi-
nessmen to go on her appeal bond, and they all refused, but
affiant did not try to mortgage the farm or use it as security.
Palm v. Palm's Estate:?' (1) income, $1.25 and $1.35 per hour
as expert carpenter, expenses not indicated; (6) affiant and his
attorney asked two persons, including affiant's son who owed
affiant $300, to sign bond.
Analysis indicates that the inability of an affiant to pay costs
is determined by no one factor alone, but rather is determined
by the affiant's total financial picture. It cannot be said that if an
affiant makes $320 per month, as in Wright v. Peurifoy,82 he will
necessarily be denied an appeal without bond; nor will a bond-
free appeal necessarily be allowed if the affiant is required to
expend $320 or more for the necessities of himself and his de-
pendents. The affiant should also develop the facts concerning the
29 139 Tex. 536, 164 S. W. 2d 19 (1942).
80 226 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
81250 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
82 260 S. W. 2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
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property he owns, his indebtedness, physical illness in his family,
his efforts to obtain the costs or security, and the probable amount
of the costs.
The decisions frequently digest the factors of inability in order
to determine the ultimate issue - whether the affiant could pay
the court costs and still have enough money left for the necessities
of life. In all six of the cited cases where the affidavit prevailed,
the affiant showed that his income and property were required to
pay the necessities of life for him and his dependents. In all five
cases where the affidavit failed, the affiant failed to present facts
on this point, or the facts showed that he had property which
could have been sold or mortgaged to obtain the costs. The rela-
tionship between income and necessities of life was specifically
recognized in the only Texas Supreme Court decision on this sub-
ject in the last twenty years, Pinchback v. Hockles.3 In this case
the court stated:
Obviously, if a laborer was barely earning the necessities of life for
himself and family, ordinarily he should not be required to mortgage
his hand tools or his household furniture in order to raise funds to
pay the court costs. On the other hand, if a party has a credit rating
that will enable him to borrow the money, or if he is earning a substan-
tial income, although he is expending it as rapidly as it comes in, or if
he owns an automobile or truck or other valuable property, although
exempted from execution, which he could mortgage or otherwise dis-
pose of and thereby secure the necessary funds without depriving him-
self and his family of the necessities of life, he should be required to
pay the costs, or give security therefor.34
In Stephens v. Dodson35 the affiant testified "it... [took] every
penny she . . . [got] hold of to support herself and children and
she ... [had] no money left when she ...paid her bills." The
court stated, "There is no testimony that she endeavored to mort-
gage the farm or use it as security for the costs." 6
33 139 Tex. 536, 164 S. W. 2d 19 (1942).
34 Id. at 538, 164 S. W. 2d at 20.
35 226 S. W. 2d 924, 925 (Tex. Civ. App. 150).
36 Id. at 926.
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The law in Texas is, therefore, that if a person owns property
which he can mortgage or sell without depriving himself and his
family of the necessities of life, he is disqualified from proceed-
ing without the payment of costs. In Stephens v. Dodson the $5000
farm owned by affiant, although a homestead, was not occupied
by affiant and her family, and drew an annual rental of only $190.
Affiant relied for her income primarily upon her job at a drug-
store. In Adkins v. DuPont7 the affiant resided in her $3450-home,
and her only source of income was rentals from units she rented
in said home. The factual distinctions between these two cases
may delineate the boundary between ability and inability to pay
costs, so far as property ownership is concerned.
As to factors (2) and (3), whether the property of the affiant
is exempted is of no significance so long as it can be mortgaged."
Inasmuch as the reasoning of the Supreme Court of the United
States in Adkins v. DuPont is substantially the same as the reason-
ing of the Texas courts, and the rulings are reconcilable, it is con-
cluded that the federal and Texas law on factors of inability are
substantially the same.
The first pertinent English statute allowed free proceedings to
persons worth less than five pounds, excepting their wearing
apparel and the matters under consideration in the law suit in
which the affidavit was filed. 9 These exceptions are still honored
in the present English law (which has far higher limits than five
pounds)." None of the recent decisions in the federal or Texas
courts requires a party to account for his contingent rights in the
law suit in which he seeks to proceed without paying or securing
costs.
41
37 335 U. S. 331 (1948).
38 Pinchback v. Hockles, 139 Tex. 536, 164 S. W. 2d 19 (1942).
392 Hen. VII, c. 12 (1487).
40 See In Re Atkin's Trusts, [1909] 1 Ch. 471, 78 L. J. Ch. (n. s.) 307 (1908).
41 Although in Stark v. Dodd, 76 S. W. 2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934), the court
made note of the fact that affiant was suing in two other cases for $185,000 in cut




Although it would appear that a party who could raise no
money whatsoever for court costs would ordinarily be unable to
obtain a corporate surety on his bond because of the premiums
required, and would ordinarily have no friends or relatives who
would go on his bond, several of the foregoing decisions indicate
that every affiant should produce evidence that he has tried to
borrow money for costs and has asked people to be sureties on
his bond.42
Two other aspects of the Adkins v. DuPont decision should be
considered. The first is the ruling that the attorney for the affiant
does not have to state his own inability to pay the costs, even
though he is to share in the recovery if his client's claim is upheld.
This ruling brings the federal law into line with the long-standing
law of Texas on the point.43
The second is the ruling that a plaintiff, in order to proceed
without costs, need not obtain the inability affidavits of all co-
plaintiffs. Texas decisions are not so clear on this point. In Pinch-
back v. Hockles44 the court overruled a motion by two co-parties
for a proceeding without costs, but in this case, unlike Adkins v.
DuPont, the co-parties filed a joint affidavit instead of separate
ones. The decision considered almost exclusively the financial
status of only one of the co-parties, except for noting, "No show-
ing is made as to the credit rating of either of the parties, nor as
to their ability to borrow funds with which to pay the costs." 45
With better facts, a co-party might file a separate affidavit in a
Texas court and be allowed to proceed free of costs, regardless
of the ruling as to the other co-parties. In Texas courts, as in
federal courts, each co-party should stand upon his own ability
or inability.46
42 E.g., see cases cited supra notes 25 and 28.
43 See Notes, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 207, 210 (1943), 48 Harv. L. Rev. 127 (1934).
44 139 Tex. 536, 164 S. W. 2d 19 (1943).
45 Id. at 537, 164 S. W. 2d at 19.
46 See Note, 11 A.L.R. 2d 607-617 (1950).
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On one other point both federal and Texas decisions state a
rule which appears out of line with the usual liberal philosophy
on court costs. When one suit has already been dismissed for any
reason, the plaintiff therein may not bring a new suit on the same
cause of action until he pays the costs of the previous suit, regard-
less of how poor he is."1
It is a tribute to the Anglo-American judicial system, as prac-
ticed in both federal and Texas jurisdictions, that the courts have
kept in step with our changing economy in their determination of
financial inability. By comparing the modern cases heretofore
cited with the cases cited in a similar study of financial inability
written more than thirty years ago,4" one can see that as the pur-
chasing power of the dollar has decreased, the courts have per-
mitted cost-free proceedings to persons with higher and higher
incomes. Now that the courts examine the ratio of income to neces-
sary expenses, it is probable that the courts will be all the more
able to keep up with economic conditions, good or bad.
Cases on inability affidavits have not been limited to hard times,
as may be deduced by observing that six of the eleven cases here-
tofore analyzed were filed in prosperous years for the nation.
There are always citizens who are unable to give security for costs.
Frequently their inability was caused by the very act of the de-
fendant out of which the suit arose, such as a tragic collision or
a long-sustained exaction of usury. One of the tactics of usurers
in court is to engage in lengthy delaying procedures and technical
objections at each stage of pleading and trial, thus running up the
court costs. Likewise, usurers refuse to divulge their records, thus
necessitating discovery action by the plaintiff. It would indeed be
against the interests of society if such parties, as a result of a con-
test filed by them or a court clerk against an inability affidavit,
could obtain the dismissal of lawsuits because they had by their
own actions financially disabled the plaintiff and caused large
47 See Note, 156 A.L.R. 956, 962 (1945).
48 See Note, 6 A.L.R. 1281 (1920).
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court costs to accrue. The inability affidavit is thus not only an
institution for equalizing access to justice in general among all
citizens, but is also a specific shield of defense against those who
would attempt to suppress opposition in court by methods causing
inability to pay costs.
The noteworthy improvement of the substantive law on inability
to pay costs does not enable financially ill-equipped persons to
surmount the barrier of court costs. In Texas, grave inequality
persists because of procedural ambushes which can be avoided
only by the most patient and persistent affiants, aided by the most
careful attorneys.
FEDERAL PROCEDURE ON INABILITY AFFIDAVITS
In federal court the procedure on inability affidavits is set forth
in a single statute,49 with the exceptions that a complementary
statute provides for the administration of payment by the United
States for a transcript of evidence when allowed on free appeal,5"
and a federal rule permits the district court to provide for pre-
paring the record on free appeal in an economical manner,51 e.g.,
in narrative form. These statutory provisions are substantially
the same as when enacted in 1892,52 except that the privilege was
extended to appellants in 1910,"a and to defendants in 1910 and
1948;"4 and that in 1922 the United States undertook prepaying
the costs of printing the record on appeal ;15 and that in 1948
the requirement of stating one's poverty was stricken. The fed-
eral statute, which covers criminal as well as civil actions, pro-
vides that an affidavit may be filed at any time in the proceedings
49 62 STAT. 954 (1948), amended, 63 STAT. 104 (1949), 65 STAT. 727 (1951) ; 28
U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 1915.
5062 STAT. 922 (1948), 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 75(f).
51 Rule 75m, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1946). See 3 MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE (1938) (1952 Cum. Supp.) c. 75.
52 27 STAT. 252.
53 36 STAT. 66.
54 36 STAT. 866, 62 STAT. 922.
55 42 STAT. 666.
56 62 STAT. 922.
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in any federal court, averring that the affiant is unable to pay the
costs or give security therefor, and stating the nature of the action,
defense or appeal and affiant's belief that he is entitled to redress.
No appeal may be taken on affidavit if the trial court certifies in
writing that it is not taken in good faith.
Inasmuch as the federal courts have held that the right to pro-
ceed without prepayment of costs is a privilege, limited by statute,
and not a right,57 and the statute limits the privilege to citizens,
the affidavit should recite that affiant is a citizen of the United
States.5"
The application to proceed without prepayment of costs may
be made even after the court has entered an order requiring
security for costs.59 The affidavit should be accompanied by a
motion for leave to proceed thereupon.60 The statute requires
specific court authorization before the affidavit has any effect.
The act does not specifically provide for a contest, but the
-decisions reflect that written opposition may be filed by adverse
parties and may be granted by the court.61 The act makes no pro-
vision for the presentation of testimony when the affidavit is
contested, but the decisions reflect that testimony can be taken in
the federal courts to determine the financial inability of an affiant,
at least on motion to dismiss.62 If the written opposition contains
factual statements, better practice is that it be verified.63 Although
no specific time limit is imposed for the filing of a contest, it has
been held that a motion to set aside an order allowing a proceed-
ing on inability affidavit may be barred by unreasonable delay.64
57 Higgins v. Steele, 195 F. 2d 366 (8th Cir. 1952).
58 For form of affidavit see 5 BARRON, DARNIEDER & KEOGH, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE (Rules ed. 1951) § 4483.
59 Woods v. Bailey, 113 Fed. 390 (2d Cir. 1902).
60 For form see 5 BARRON, DARNIEDER & KEOGH, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE,
(Rules ed. 1951) § 4482.
6r Nix v. U. S., 131 F. 2d 857 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 771 (1943).
62 Woods v. Bailey, 113 Fed. 390 (2d Cir. 1902).
(3 See 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 1948) § 34.07 n.; Victory v. Manning,
128 F. 2d 415 (3d Cir. 1942).
64 St. Louis, etc. R. Co. v. Farr, 56 Fed. 994 (8th Cir. 1893).
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An inability affidavit for appeal from one federal court to another
should first be filed in the court from which the appeal is sought,
although the appellate court has discretionary authority to con-
sider an inability affidavit first filed in such appellate court.6" In
order to obtain a free transcript of the trial proceedings, an afflant
must obtain the certificate of the court of appeals or trial court
that the appeal is not frivolous but presents a substantial question,
and also the approval of the Director of the Administrative
Office of United States Courts.66 The affidavit for cost-free appeal
should be filed and authorization obtained in advance of the thirty-
day deadline for filing notice of appeal, so that timely filing of
the notice of appeal may not be prevented.67 Otherwise, the clerk
may refuse to file the notice of appeal, and the appeal may be a
nullity.6
Although the statute does not specifically so provide, the deci-
sions hold that the application to proceed without prepayment of
costs will be denied if it appears that the affiant's cause or appeal
is without merit.69 Therefore, a full statement of the justice of the
cause of action or ground of appeal should be included in the
affidavit, and on appeal affidavit the affiant should attach copies
of the proceedings below wherever they will help show the merit
of the appeal.
In the federal courts the procedure for review of a lower court
ruling is restrictive. Let us first observe how a party obtains review
of a trial court ruling as to an affidavit of inability to pay for
trial court proceedings. It has been stated in Crockett v. U. S.,7"
65 Nix v. U. S., 131 F. 2d 857 (5th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U. S. 771 (1943).
66McLeod v. Union Barge Line Co., 11 F.R.D. 167 (W. D. Pa. 1951), holding ap-
proval is jurisdictional.
6(7 Smith v. Johnston, 109 F. 2d 152 (9th Cir. 1940) ; see 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp.
V, § 1917.
68 See 3 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE (Rules ed. 1950)
§ 1553.
69 Holland v. Capital Transit Co., 184 F. 2d 686 (D. C. Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341
U. S. 954 (1951).
T0 136 F. 2d 11 (9th Cir. 1943).
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and Barkdoll v. U. S.,71 that an order denying leave to proceed
to trial without prepayment of costs is not a final order from
which appeal lies. The decisions on this point were based on the
fact that the proper remedy was mandamus. But it had previously
been held in Fisher v. Cushman72 that mandamus does not lie in
a case where the trial court has denied leave to appeal on inability
affidavit because such action was strictly in the discretion of the
trial court. Denial of leave to proceed to trial would then also be
impregnable to mandamus. This is true in any event because the
writ of mandamus has now been abolished in the federal courts."3
What, then, is the remedy of an affiant who has been wrongly
denied the right to proceed to trial on his inability affidavit? Can
the affiant ignore Crockett v. U. S. and Barkdoll v. U. S. because
they were based on the wrong assumption that mandamus was the
proper remedy? Can he promptly file his appeal affidavit and
seek immediate review? Or must he wait until the trial court dis-
misses his cause, and then make his appeal from the order of
dismissal? Inasmuch as an order denying leave to proceed to trial
on inability affidavit prevents further action in the trial court by
a person unable to advance court costs, the statute should be
amended to allow immediate review.
Now let us examine the procedure for review of a trial court
ruling as to an appeal affidavit. Where an applicant is denied
leave to appeal on his affidavit, he merely files in the appellate
court a new application, along with his appeal or petition for
writ of certiorari.74 The contestant has the same right to review.
When the appeal on inability affidavit reaches the appellate
court, the contestant by appropriate motion may bring to the
attention of the appellate court his contention that the trial court
erred in finding that the appeal was in good faith and meritorious.
71 147 F. 2d 617-619 (9th Cir. 1945).
72 99 F. 2d 918 (9th Cir. 1938). Note that this decision was by the same court that
decided the Crockett and Barkdoll cases.
78 Rule 81(b), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
74 Adkins v. DuPont, 335 U. S. 331 (1948) ; Steffler v. U. S., 319 U. S. 38 (1943).
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According to Higgins v. Steele75 the appellate court can then take
a look at the documents and dismiss the appeal if it is satisfied
the appeal is frivolous or malicious. The review may also be had
on the question of whether the affiant is actually unable to pay
costs, as in Adkins v. DuPont.
There are dicta to the effect that a trial court order denying
an affidavit for appeal is not a final order from which an appeal
lies.76 These dicta would appear to be contradictory to the earlier
decision of the Supreme Court in Adkins v. DuPont, except that
the court of appeals then turns around and examines the appeal,
and thus does afford a review in spite of its dicta to the contrary.
The wording of the decision reflects an obvious desire of the
court to be able to screen the excessive number of habeas corpus
appeals which are without merit. Inasmuch as the federal proce-
dure is the same for civil and criminal cases, there is a danger
that the attitude of the court in Higgins v. Steele may, by stare
decisis, lead to the virtual impossibility of an affiant's obtaining
review of a trial court denial of free appeal in civil cases.
In the great majority of efforts of habeas corpus applicants
to obtain a free appeal, the trial court denies an authorization
and certifies in writing that the appeal is not taken in good faith,
under the last sentence of Section (a) of the federal act.77 The
cases hold that such a certificate by the trial court is binding on
the appellate court and cannot be reviewed unless the appellant
shows that the certificate of the trial court itself was without
warrant or was not made in good faith.7' Needless to say, no
decision yet reflects that a litigant has ever successfully attacked
the good faith of a federal trial judge.
75 195 F. 2d 366 (8th Cir. 1952).
76 Id. at 367, also citing cases to the contrary.
77 "An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writ-
ing that it is not taken in good faith." 62 STAT. 954 (1948) as amended; 28 U. S. C.
1946 ed. Supp. V, § 1915(a).
78 Wells v. U. S., 318 U. S. 257 (1943); Newman v. U. S., 184 F. 2d 275 (D. C. Cir.
1950) ; Johnson v. Hunter, 144 F. 2d 565 (10th Cir. 1944).
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The Supreme Court has advised that the inability affidavit
should follow the words of the statute. Although in two cases
the Supreme Court was lenient about the form of the affidavit
when such leniency appeared necessary in order to expound the
law, 0 it seems clear that an inability affidavit will stand little
chance of review in the appellate court if it fails to state whether
the trial court made a certificate of good faith.81
PROCEDURE ON INABILITY AFFIDAVIT IN TEXAS COURTS
In the Texas courts, instead of finding the procedure for inabil-
ity affidavits consolidated into one statute, one discovers that the
procedure is scattered through nine Rules of Civil Procedure,
which contain many purposelessly varying provisions, with many
a possible pitfall.8 2
The inability affidavit may be filed at any stage in the proceed-
ing, even after the court has ruled the party for costs.8 3 Rule 145
extends the privilege of proceeding to trial on inability affidavits
to the plaintiff only. The Texas Rules extend the privilege to all
plaintiffs and appellants, apparently whether residents of Texas or
elsewhere, 4 and in at least one recent case where no objection was
made on the point, a non-resident successfully appealed to the
Supreme Court of Texas on inability affidavit.85
Two steps must always be taken by the affiant in filing an
inability affidavit, the filing and the notice to adverse parties.
The affidavit, if for proceeding in the trial court, must include
7'Adkins v. DuPont, 335 U. S. 331 (1948).
80 Id. at 333; Kenney v. Plymouth Rock Squab Co., 236 U. S. 43 (1915).
81 Bayless v. Johnston, 127 F. 2d 531 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Smith v. U. S., 124 F. 2d 517
(9th Cir. 1941).
82 Rules 126, 145, 333, 361, 444, 485, 508, 572. See FRANKI, VERNON'S TEXAS RULES
of CIVIL PROCEDURE (1942).
8 1 Brooks v. Hicks, 20 Tex. 666 (1858) ; Warren v. Scarborough, 241 S. W. 551 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1922).
84 Notwithstanding Jenks v. Jenks, 47 Tex. 220 (1877), decided under a former
notary public statute, and Fletcher v. Anderson, 145 S. W. 622 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912)
decided under provisions discarded in Rule 572.
s' Rumpf v. Rumpf -............- Tex -............. 242 S. W. 2d 416 (1951).
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two representations, namely, that the affiant is unable to pay the
court costs and that he is unable to make security therefor.8 The
affiant's attorney, if a notary public, has been permitted to take
the acknowledgment.8 7 One co-party may make the oath for him-
self and the other co-party, at least under certain circumstances.
88
A next friend may take the oath for a minor. 9
An appeal affidavit, except in probate, must aver that the affiant
is unable to pay the costs of appeal "or any part thereof," or to
give security therefor.9" On appeal of a probate matter from
county court to district court, the affidavit must recite that the
affiant has made diligent effort to give bond and has been unable
to do so by reason of his poverty.9' A recent opinion contains a
dictum that failure to recite diligent effort is fatal regardless of
whether the undisputed facts at the hearing show that a diligent
effort was made.92 This dictum sounds more like a pronunciamento
of the Middle Ages than a declaration under the twelve-year-old
Rules of Civil Procedure, and will surely not be accepted gen-
erally as the law. The careful practitioner will, of course, follow
Rule 333 strictly in preparing his affidavit, in order to avoid any
such pitfall.
The second step, notice of filing, is not specifically made a
duty of the affiant under the inability affidavit Rules, but is so
under the general Rule applicable.9 However, the Rules on appeal
86 Rule 145.
87 Ryburn v. Moore, 72 Tex. 85, 10 S. W. 393 (1888).
88 Dignowity v. Fly, 110 Tex. 613, 223 S. W. 165 (1920) ; Clark v. Briley, 193 S. W.
419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) er. ref. The same may be said with respect to appeal affidavits,
Morrison v. Brooks, 189 S. W. 1094 (Tex. Civ. App. 1916). To be safe, all co-parties
eligible should sign. See Dixie Motor Coach Corp. v. Wilson, 138 S. W. 2d 314 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1940) ; Boone v. McBee, 280 S. W. 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926) ; Crocket v.
Maxey, 18 S. W. 138 (Tex. Civ. App. 1892).
8 St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. Williams, 37 S. W. 992 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896) er. dism.
See Carlisle v. Wilson, 103 S. W. 2d 434 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
50 Rules 355 (a), 572; but cf. Rules 388-A, 444, 485, 508. The omission of "or any part
thereof" has been held not to invalidate an affidavit. Stewart v. Heidenheimer, 55 Tex.
644 (1881).
91 Rule 333.
92 Palm v. Palm's Estate, 250 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
93 Rule 72.
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affidavits specifically require the court clerk to give the notice.9
Once having been filed, the affidavit entitles the affiant to pro-
ceed without prepayment or security for costs, but if he loses,
the final judgment may include an assessment of costs against
him.95 However, a contest may be filed, in which event, under all
the Rules, the burden reverts to the affiant to establish his right
to proceed on his affidavit.
A contest may be filed by the clerk, justice, or any adverse
party,96 and, against an appeal affidavit, by any other interested
officer of the court.9" The form of the contest is unspecified in the
Rules, except that Rule 355(c) requires the contest of an appeal
affidavit to be under oath. Perhaps all that is necessary under
Rule 355(c) is to state that the appellee contests the appellant's
affidavit, and to add an acknowledgment of that fact. If this were
the only intent of the Rule, the requirement for an oath would
be useless. The only interpretation which would give meaning to
the oath requirement would be that specific facts are required
tending to show that the appellant is able to pay costs.
The time for filing a contest in the county and district court
is in the same term in which the affidavit was filed, and the contest
must likewise be heard in said term.9" It is difficult to prognos-
ticate what the courts will hold if a case arises where contest is
filed in the same term as the inability affidavit but is not heard
within that term. Contest of an appeal affidavit in justice court
must be filed within five days after notice of the affidavit,99 and
in district court within ten days after notice.' 9
Rule 145 does not state who should give notice of setting of
94 Rule 355(b). This is the only instance in the Rules where the court clerk has such
responsibility except in the event an out-of-town attorney makes special request under
Rule 246.
95 McPherson v. Johnson, 69 Tex. 484, 6 S. W. 798 (1888).
9s Rule 145.






the contest hearing, except on appeal affidavit, but Rule 72 would
appear to place this burden on the contestant. On appeal affidavit
the clerk issues notice of setting.'0 '
At the hearing all the Rules concerning inability affidavits place
the burden of proof on the affiant, in contrast to the common law
before the adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure.' 2 The analy-
sis of the factors of inability in a preceding section of this article
indicates that the affiant who presents evidence in the greatest
detail on the largest number of factors of inability has the best
chance of defeating the contest.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court may sustain the
contest in whole or in part, ordering either payment or security,
or both for all or a part of the costs,1' or may overrule the con-
test. Rule 355(f) leaves open a difficult question: can the trial
court frustrate an appeal against his final judgment in a cause by
entering an order, after the time for filing an appeal bond has
expired, requiring the affiant to make a bond for some small part
of the costs, for example, five dollars? Failure by the affiant to
have filed such a bond would deprive the appellate court of juris-
diction,104 unless the appellant should by writ of mandamus re-
quire the trial court order to be set aside. But it would be difficult
for the appellant to convince the appellate court that the five-
dollar security requirement was without support in the facts below,
since almost anybody can raise five dollars one way or another
when he is forced to do so.
An inability affidavit may be filed originally in the Texas
appellate courts at all stages of an original or appellate proceed-
101 Ibid.
1 02Currie v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 101 Tex. 478, 108 S. W. 1167 (1908) ; Tisdale
v. F. Hannes & Co., 278 S. W. 324 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). Contra: Durant v. Stone, 97
S. W. 2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Stark v. Dodd, 76 S. W. 2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App.
1934).
103 Rule 355(f). The court probably has the same power under Rules 145 and 572.
104 De Miller v. Yzaguirre, 143 S. W. 2d 425 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940) er. rel.
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ing in such courts. °5 The Rules on affidavits in appellate courts,
with the possible exception of Rule 361, which is vague, all
adopt the procedure set forth in Rule 355 for the contest of an
affidavit. Carrying out such procedure would require a regular
court trial with witnesses before the court of civil appeals or
supreme court on the factual question of affiant's inability to
pay costs. A preferable method of conducting an inability affidavit
contest in the appellate courts would be strictly by affidavit, as
was done in Texas Central Railway Company v. Pledger.'
The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide for no review of a
lower court ruling on an inability contest, with the exception of a
unique type of review by the county court of a justice court
action sustaining a contest. 0
7
In the absence of provision for review in the statutes and Rules,
the courts of civil appeals have been reviewing the county and
district court rulings through mandamus proceedings. Such pro-
ceedings have always been brought by the affiant against whom a
contest has been sustained.'08 The reason contestants do not apply
for mandamus may be their recognition that they have another
remedy which becomes available on appeal of the case. If contest-
ant loses the main case below, he may then appeal from the prior
adverse ruling of the trial court on his contest, although it would
appear that the point would then be moot. No contestant has ever
attempted such an appeal.' 9 I contestant on the other hand, al-
though unsuccessful in opposing the inability affidavit, is victor
in the main case below, he may file a motion in the court of civil
appeals to dismiss the appeal on the ground his contest below
should have been sustained."0
105 Rules 361, 388-A, 444 (courts of civil appeal) ; Rules 485, 508 (supreme court).
100 85 S. W. 470 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905).
107 Rule 572. Such a review was considered as a mandamus proceeding in Hardin v.
Hamilton, 204 S. W. 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918), and yet the same decision speaks of the
review as a hearing de novo.
108 Cases cited supra notes 22-28, 30.
109 But see unusual circumstances in Palm v. Palm's Estate, 250 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1952).
110 See Clark v. Briley, 193 S.W. 419 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) er. rel.
1953]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
Since substantially all Texas reviews of lower court rulings on
inability affidavits are through the mandamus route, examination
will now be made of how the mandamus procedure is applied to
such cases. 1 '
An affiant seeking a mandamus against a trial judge who denied
his right to proceed or appeal by affidavit promptly encounters the
rule that mandamus lies against a public official only in case of
willful misconduct or abuse of discretion." 2 Where mandamus is
against the trial judge, as usual in these cases, the findings of
fact by the trial judge on disputed issues are accepted as binding
on the court of civil appeals."' Therefore, the only time an affiant
can obtain mandamus, his only means of review, is when the un-
disputed testimony below clearly establishes that he is unable to
pay the costs. 14 This is an unfair handicap, especially in view
of the fact that the decision involves not merely a party's right to
win, but also a party's right to have his cause adjudicated or
reviewed on the merits.
In the mandamus action the relator must include as parties
respondent the court official or officials who have violated their
duty with regard to the inability affidavit"' and the adverse
parties litigant.' Usually, the trial judge is the court official who
is made the principal respondent. Where the relator seeks a writ
of mandamus specifically naming the court clerk and the court
reporter therein, the court clerk and court reporter have been held
in one case to be indispensable parties."7 But otherwise, unless
the court clerk or court reporter is charged with a specific viola.
tion of his official duty, he is not a proper party.ns
1 Rule 383.
112 See Warren v. Scarborough, 241 S. W. 551 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922).
11 Wortham v. Walker, 133 Tex. 255, 128 S. W. 2d 1138 (1939).
114 Stephens v. Dodson, 226 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
115 Durant v. Stone, 97 S. W. 2d 1006 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) ; Stark v. Dodd, 76 S. W.
2d 865 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
116 Williams v. Wray, 123 Tex. 466, 72 S. W. 2d 577 (1934).
117 Caldwell v. Boyd, 146 S. W. 2d 296 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
118 See case cited supra note 115.
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The rule that the adverse litigants must be made party respond-
ents to the mandamus action is unique in the law. Nowhere else
is there an example of the necessity to join as a party someone
against whom no order whatsoever is sought or even authorized.
In the line of decisions expressing the rule that the adverse liti-
gants must be joined in the mandamus action, although several
cases hold that the motion for leave to file the original petition
for mandamus is fatally defective,1 9 and some say that the peti-
tion for mandamus itself is fatally defective, 2 ' none of the
decisions necessarily holds that the adverse litigants are indis-
pensable parties to the mandamus proceeding, because in none
of those cases does it appear that the non-joinder was called to the
attention of the court after it had acted upon the petition for man-
damus. A plea of non-joinder when timely filed makes fatally
defective a proceeding even when the parties not joined are merely
conditionally necessary parties.' In one case the language shows
that the court considered the omission of the adverse litigants a
"fundamental error," but that case is not necessarily authority
that parties who are not to be named in or specifically bound by
a mandamus judgment must nevertheless be joined as indispen-
sable parties. 2
In a mandamus proceeding for review of a trial court order sus-
taining a contest of an inability affidavit, it is essential that the
119 E. g., cases cited supra notes 116, 117.
120 H. N. Cohen Lumber & Bldg. Co. v. McCalla, 142 S. W. 2d 685 (Tex. Civ. App.
1940).
121 1 McDONALD, TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE (1950) 239.
122 Rushing v. Thomas, 63 S. W. 2d 323 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933), in which the man-
damus involved was not by a court of civil appeals but was by a county court against a
county clerk for failure to issue execution against the adverse litigants in an action in
that court. The decision was based mainly upon the failure by the relator to show that
the county clerk had a clear duty to issue the execution. After deciding the case on that
ground in two and one-half pages, the court added in one-sixth of a page that the adverse
litigants should have been joined. The decision does not indicate when the respondents
first raised their point, but they obviously did so prior to motion for rehearing in the
court of civil appeals, and they may have done so in the county court; at any rate the
objection was timely enough to support the decision even if the omission was not "fun-
damental error". Thus that wording was dictum. Moreover, if mandamus had issued in
that case, the order would have directed the clerk to issue a writ of execution specifically
against litigants who were not joined.
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applicant for mandamus include in his application a record of the
testimony in the trial court. If the applicant fails to do this, it will
be impossible to show the appellate court that the trial judge
abused his discretion in making a ruling contrary to the undis-
puted evidence. An applicant for mandamus, without presenting
a record of the testimony to the court of civil appeals, is at the
mercy of the findings of the trial judge.2 3
The suggested method of presenting the record of the testimony
to the court of civil appeals is to attempt to follow the provisions
of Rule 377, although this Rule applies to the preparation of the
statement of facts on appeal, and not on mandamus, which is an
original proceeding in the court of civil appeals coming under
Rule 388-A. If the agreement of opposing counsel or the approval
of the trial court is not immediately obtainable under Rule
377(d), the transcript of the testimony, bearing the affidavit of
the court reporter that it is a full and complete transcript of the
testimony at the hearing, should be incorporated into the petition
for writ of mandamus.
There is no provision whatsoever in Texas law for obtaining
such a transcript of the testimony without prepayment of the court
reporter's fee. This means that a person unable to pay the costs of
appeal must obtain the sympathy of the court reporter or the
necessary sum to prepay the preparation of a transcript of the
testimony at the hearing on the inability affidavit in order to obtain
a review of a trial judge's ruling against such affiant. Therefore,
a trial judge's adverse ruling on an affidavit of inability to pay
costs is almost impregnable to review as a practical matter. Such
a situation is unconscionable, and would appear to encourage in
the trial court a feeling of almost absolute authority on the vital
question of whether or not a financially ill-equipped person can
proceed in court.
The filing of the mandamus action in the court of civil appeals
123 Palm v. Palm's Estate, 250 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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would ordinarily, under Rule 388-A, require a ten-dollar deposit
on filing of motion for leave to file the petition for writ of manda-
mus, and if leave is granted, an additional fifteen-dollar deposit
for the filing of the petition. But these requirements can be
avoided by the filing of a separate inability affidavit in the court
of civil appeals under the provisions of the last paragraph of
Rule 388-A.
If an affiant, denied the right to proceed in the trial court,
obtains a writ of mandamus against the trial judge, he must
return to the trial court and obtain an order under Rule 380 for
a free narrative transcript of the evidence. Then, finally, he will
be in a position to perfect his appeal. If the court reporter refuses
to comply with the order under Rule 380, he is subject to con-
tempt action by the trial court. If the court clerk refuses to prepare
the transcript under Rule 376, he is subject to a mandamus order
by the trial judge and, if he disobeys same, to a contempt pro-
ceeding. In some cases mandamus has been brought directly in
the court of civil appeals against a court clerk who refused to
file a case without a deposit of costs,124 and it is probable that
such a mandamus would also lie directly in the court of civil
appeals against a court clerk who refused to make a free tran-
script after a free appeal became authorized under Rule 355.
If mandamus proceedings have become necessary, such delay
will be encountered that the affiant is unlikely to be able to file
his statement of facts in the trial court within fifty days as re-
quired by Rule 381(a), and will need to apply for an extension
of time in the trial court under Rule 381(b). Furthermore, the
affiant is unlikely to be able to file his transcript and statement
of facts in the court of civil appeals within sixty days under Rule
386, and therefore will probably have to file a motion for exten-
sion in the court of civil appeals under such Rule. Such a motion
would ordinarily require a five-dollar court cost deposit under
Rule 388-A, but the affiant may make a new inability affidavit
124 See Van Benthuysen v. Gengler, 100 S. W. 2d 116 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
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in the court of civil appeals under the last paragraph of Rule
388-A, in order to avoid the necessity for such a cost deposit.
PROPOSED REFORM OF TEXAS PROCEDURE
In 1923 Professor Maguire stated that the keynote of our in-
ability affidavit laws in the United States was discord.12 It has
been observed that our federal and Texas substantive law, un-
hampered by statutory technicalities, has, since Professor
Maguire's article, caught up with the times in formulating a
utilitarian standard of judging inability to pay costs. The briefing
of federal procedure earlier in this article demonstrates that
Congress has long ago worked out a simple, uniform system of
inability proceedings except in regard to review of lower court
rulings on inability affidavits. By way of contrast, the foregoing
briefing of Texas procedure shows that in Texas the same pro-
cedural discord and obfuscation noted by Professor Maguire in
1923 continues.'26
For no apparent reason, the affidavit in the Texas trial courts
is not required to contain a recitation that the affiant is unable
to pay "any part" of the costs, nor do Rules 388-A, 444, 485 and
508 in the appellate courts require such a recitation; but Rule
355, governing appeals from the county and district courts, and
Rule 572, governing appeals from justice courts, do require such
a recitation. Rule 333, governing appeals from county to district
courts, requires a totally different recitation from all the other
Rules. Rule 361, governing writs of error from the courts of civil
appeals to the district courts, fails to specify which of the fore-
going requirements applies. If a party makes his affidavit under
the wrong Rule, it may cost him his day in court." 7
125 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 381 (1923).
126 Id. at 399.
127 Palm v. Palm's Estate, 250 S. W. 2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952). But in the matter
of substantial compliance and right to amend see Commercial Credit Corp. v. Smith,
143 Tex. 612, 187 S. W. 2d 363 (1945), and Davis v. Cavanaugh, 231 S. W. 2d 959 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 149 Tex. 573, 235 S. W. 2d 972 (1951).
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Mention has been made how Rules 145 and 572 differ from
the other Rules concerning how notice of filing of the affidavit or
contest must be given. Likewise, note has been taken how Rule
355 and the Rules incorporating it require an oath of some vague
sort, whereas Rules 145 and 572 require no oath.
The requirement under Rule 145 of filing and trying a contest
in the same term as the inability affidavit is filed is an encourage-
ment of the filing of protective contests which are not based upon
investigation or facts, but which are hurriedly made in order to pre-
serve the right of contest. The same objection applies to the five-day
requirement for contest in the justice court under Rule 572 and
to the ten-day requirement under Rule 355. Furthermore, the
imposition of such time limits prevents the parties from filing a
later contest in the event the affiant's circumstances improve to
where he would be able to pay court costs.
The requirement under Rule 126 that the clerk endorse the
citation, "pauper's oath filed", is not only an invitation to tech-
nical error, threatening the validity of the citation, but is also
objectionable as a throwback to the old "pauper" concept. This
requirement, and the reference to "poverty" in Rule 333, should
be eliminated. Such references tend to distort the substantive law
and to place upon inability affidavit proceedings a discredit which
is contrary to the spirit of equal justice. Deserving persons who
have meritorious causes of action but are unable to advance costs
will frequently sacrifice their rights rather than sign an instrument
entitled a "pauper's oath". The Latin phrase, "in forma pau-
peris", so commonly used in the federal courts, sounds so much
like its English derivative that it is almost as effective a handicap
upon an unfortunate litigant. The "affidavit of inability to pay
costs" bears no such opprobrious connotation.
Just as Rule 572 sets up a review procedure after denial of
affiant's right to proceed, so should Rules 145 and 355 establish
a review procedure. The latter procedure should afford the court
1953]
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of civil appeals the same power to determine the facts as it has
in an ordinary appeal from a trial before the court without a
jury.
A complete analysis of the legislative history of the present
Rules concerning inability affidavits reveals that, except for the
extension of the privilege to appeal in 187128 and 1887,129 and
a slight clarification in the justice court appeal procedure in
1931,13 there has been no progress whatsoever in the past
century. 3' When the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted,
the long-stagnant statutes on inability affidavits were taken into
the Rules almost verbatim. The only noteworthy changes were
the shifting of the burden of proof from the contestant to the
affiant, a leap backward twenty centuries to the era before the
Roman Republic first allowed cost-free proceedings to persons
who merely made oath of their inability,' and the withdrawal
of the privilege from defendants in spite of the fact that many
defendants are financially ill-equipped and may incur costs as the
trial proceeds. 31 Since the Rules became effective on September
1, 1941,1" the only important change concerning inability affi-
davits was the extension of the privilege in 1950 to cover original
proceedings in the court of civil appeals.
Why has Texas procedure lagged so badly in this field while
the Texas courts have been able to keep the substantive law
up-to-date? In answering this question it must be remembered
that substantively, under the doctrine of stare decisis, the courts
have not been bogged down by rigid statutes or rules, and have
been free to maintain a flexible standard for judging inability.
Having been free to do so, they have sustained the inability
128 Acts 1871, c. 71, § 1; PASCHAL'S ANN. DIe. OF TEX. LAWS (2d ed. 1870) art. 6180.
129 Acts 1887, c. 122; 9 GAMMEL'S LAWS OF TEXAS (1898) 911.
130Acts 1931, c. 134, § 2; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. (1925) art. 2457.
131 See Acts 1846, pp. 363, 366, § 8; PASCHAL'S ANN. DIG. OF TEX. LAWS (2d ed.
1870) art. 1429; effective from 1846 to 1871.
132 See Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 362 (1923).
133 See Rules 73, 170(c).
134 Rule 814.
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affidavit on the basis of reasonable standards whenever an un-
usually determined affiant has managed to press his case through
the procedural morass to a consideration on the merits. But while
the courts were free to reason on the substantive law, they were
bound by the procedure left with them by the legislature until the
supreme court obtained the rule-making authority in 1939."'
One reason that the legislature and the supreme court have
devoted so little attention to cost inability procedure is that the
Bar has been indifferent to its responsibility of protecting the
equality of the financially ill-equipped in the courts. Those who
should be most acutely aware of the obstacles confronting the
financially ill-equipped litigant are the practicing attorneys. Yet
no proposed reforms in cost inability procedure have been pre-
sented to the legislature or the supreme court by the Bar.
In view of the defects in Texas procedure on cost inability
affidavits, one might surmise that the Texas Rules in this respect
are the worst in the nation, and possibly that is now true, but it
was not so when Professor Maguire surveyed the field in 1923.136
Procedural defects were rampant throughout the American juris-
dictions which recognized the inability affidavit. And in many
states there was no provision whatsoever for the inability affi-
davit,1"' except insofar as those states had adopted the common
law of England." 8' What reforms the other states have accom-
plished since Professor Maguire vigorously alerted them is a
subject for another article. Our immediate concern is the reform
of Texas procedure.
As possible guides for the improvement of cost inability pro-
cedure in Texas, the standards set forth by Professor Maguire for
model legislation are available," 9 as well as his second draft of a
Poor Litigant's Statute, reported by the Committee on Legal Aid
135 Acts 1939, c. 25, p. 201; TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 1731a.
136 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361, 381-390 (1923).
137 Id. at 362.
138 See Note, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 207 (1943).
139 Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv L. Rev. 361, 399 (1943).
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Work of the American Bar Association. 40 These guides attack
both the substantive and the procedural issues. Inasmuch as the
substantive law on determination of inability is now satisfactorily
formulated in Texas and is admirably adapted to all economic
trends, specific reform proposals may be confined to the pro-
cedural field.
L
Appended hereto is a tentative proposal for a unified Rule on
inability affidavits. This proposed Rule unifies the procedure in
all Texas courts. It provides a definite outline for the contents of
the affidavit, affording all the information to which the court clerk
and adverse parties are entitled, thus discouraging unqualified
persons from attempts to make baseless affidavits, and at the same
time reducing the likelihood of a qualified affiant's losing the
privilege because his lawyer failed to adduce all the facts. The
requirement of a complete affidavit also eliminates the need for
a hearing of testimony, thus affording to the courts some relief
from clogging of their dockets, and saving the parties time and
expense. The elimination of the hearing also enables the litigants
to obtain review of a ruling on the fact question of inability
without having to pay the expense of a transcript of the evidence,
which payment would be impossible for a truly needy litigant.
The requirement that all contests based on the factual question
of inability must be specific and under oath should relieve the
court dockets of most dilatory and frivolous contests. The elimi-
nation of time schedules for the contest will for the first time
afford to potential contestants a reasonable opportunity to investi.
gate the inability affidavit before deciding whether or not to
contest it, thus providing for an effective system of screening out
false affidavits at no expense to the state.
After the adoption of such a Rule, the financially ill-equipped
litigant will no longer be greatly handicapped as to court costs.
However, critical inequalities will remain. One is the unavail-
140 50 A.B.A. REP. 456 (1925).
[Vol. 7
AFFIDAVIT OF INABILITY TO PAY COSTS
ability of temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions
to those who cannot make bond.'" The courts should be em-
powered in proper cases, after notice and preliminary hearing,
to issue injunctions on inability affidavits without bond, or on bond
without sureties. A spouse seeking a divorce in Texas may obtain
a temporary restraining order or injunction without bond.'42 Such
an exception should be extended to all persons financially unable
to obtain sureties on a bond.
Another obstacle which will continue to hamper a party without
funds is his difficulty in obtaining depositions, photostatic copies
of documents, and other discovery and investigation materials,
and in paying witness fees required by statute. 43
Another inequality which remains to be eliminated is the in-
equality between the financially ill-equipped and the financially
well-equipped in ability to obtain competent legal counsel. The
federal courts are empowered to request attorneys to serve ina-
bility affiants in both civil and criminal actions, but not to pay
them for the service.' 4" In Texas there is no provision for a court
to appoint free civil counsel.
The remedies for these latter inequalities would require legis-
lation. On the other hand, the reforms proposed in this article as
to court costs can be effectuated by amendment of the Rules of
Civil Procedure by the Texas Supreme Court. Therefore, it is
practical to proceed with the court costs amendments separately
from the other reforms. 145
141 Rule 684; Rule 65(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
142 Rule 693-a.
143 Acts 1846, p. 353; TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 3708. An inability
affiant is relieved of paying witness fees in the federal courts. 62 STAT. 954 (1948), as
amended, 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 1915(c). The same would be true in Texas
under a dictum in Pinchback v. Hockles, 139 Tex. 536, 164 S. W. 2d 19, 20 (1942),
quoted in Stephens v. Dodson, 226 S. W. 2d 924 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950).
14462 STAT. 954 (1948) ; 28 U. S. C. 1946 ed. Supp. V, § 1915(d). For the value of
such a statute see Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 361 (1923).
145 However, all these problems are met simultaneously in the Second Draft of the




The age-old recognition of the privilege of cost-free proceedings
for the financially unable has been paralleled by an age-old
failure of the Anglo-American judicial system to provide ade-
quate machinery for the implementation of that privilege. In the
last twenty years the federal courts have formulated a utilitarian
substantive law, and Congress has maintained the procedural law
in workable form, except for review. The Texas courts have con-
currently arrived at the same substantive formula, but the legis-
lature and rule-making authority have neglected the highly inade-
quate procedure, not having been alerted to the problem by the
Bar. The Supreme Court of Texas, in directing its attention to
these proposed reforms, should be given the support and advice
of the Bar.
APPENDIX
SUGGESTED RULE ON INABILITY AFFIDAVITS
Rule 145. Proceedings on Inability Affidavit.
(a) Affidavit of Inability.
(1) Any party, whether resident or non-resident, citizen or alien, plaintiff,
defendant, appellant, appellee, or otherwise, who is unable to pay the costs
of court or to give security therefor shall be entitled to commence and
prosecute, defend, appeal, or otherwise proceed in any court and any judi-
cial or quasi-judicial proceeding within the scope of these Rules upon filing
with the clerk at any time prior to the time for filing the appeal bond an
affidavit that the party is unable to pay the costs of court or any part thereof
and is unable to give security therefor (other than such payment or security
already or concurrently made in said cause.)
(2) Incorporated in the affidavit should be an itemized statement, as
full and correct as possible, of the financial condition of the party on each
of the following subjects:
(a) All income received by the party, the party's spouse, and each
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person listed below as a dependent, for the past year from all sources,
itemized.
(b) Names, addresses, ages and relationship of all persons to whose
support the party is now contributing.
(c) Itemized expenses of the party and dependents for the past year
and expected changes in future expenses.
(d) All money on hand, in a bank, or otherwise available to the
party and each dependent.
(e) Description of each category of personal property and full
description of each piece of real property in which the party or any
dependent has any interest, together with statement of estimated value
of each said item and amount and description of all encumbrances.
(f) Itemization of each indebtedness against the party and each
dependent.
(g) Any further important information concerning financial con-
dition or ability of the party to borrow the money to pay costs or make
security therefor.
(3) The affidavit should state the estimated court costs accrued at the
time of filing the affidavit and the estimated costs for completion of the
action.
(4) If for appeal or writ of error, the affidavit should state the ground
or grounds for said appeal in brief but self-sufficient form.
(5) The affidavit may incorporate under oath other pertinent docu-
ments attached thereto.
(6) When the party is represented in court by a guardian, administra-
tor, executor, trustee, next friend, or other person duly authorized to
represent the personal or financial interests of the party in legal proceedings,
such representative party may make the affidavit on behalf of the repre-
sented party, and need set forth the facts concerning the represented party,
his spouse and dependents, only.
(7) The party filing the affidavit shall serve a complete copy thereof
on each adverse party in accordance with Rule 72.
(8) If the deposition of the party has been taken prior to notice of his
affidavit, the filing thereof shall entitle the adverse parties to take his deposi-
tion again, limited to the issue of his ability to pay costs or give security
therefor.
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(9) The filing of such affidavit shall entitle the party to proceed without
prepayment of costs or making of security therefor unless and until a contest
may be sustained for reasons of substance.
(b) Contest.
(1) The court clerk or any party to the suit may file a contest of the
affidavit at any time. If the affidavit is for appeal, or writ of error, the con-
test shall not be filed in the trial court subsequent to the time for filing the
appeal or application for writ of error, but if not timely filed in the lower
court may be filed in the appellate court at any time after the appeal is
perfected therein.
(2) The contest shall either attack the procedural sufficiency of the
affidavit, or state that the facts alleged in the affidavit even if true are
insufficient to warrant proceeding without prepayment of costs or giving
security, or state under oath facts contrary to or additional to those stated
in the affidavit of inability.
(3) Only one contest may be filed by each party unless a subsequent
contest states under oath specific material changes of condition of the
inability affiant since the previous contest.
(4) Upon the filing of a contest, the contestant shall notify the court
thereof and the court shall promptly consider the inability affidavit and
the contest and either sustain as to all or a part of the costs, or overrule
the contest. It shall be discretionary with the court whether oral argument
shall be made.
(5) A complete copy of the contest shall be served on each adverse party
in accordance with Rule 72.
(6) Counter-affidavits may be filed by any party to any preceding
affidavits.
(7) If the court sustains a contest for reasons of procedure, the inability
affiant shall have the right to amend.
(8) If the court sustains a contest as to a part of the costs after the
time for posting appeal bond has expired, the inability affiant may within
a reasonable time thereafter deposit in cash or make security for that part
of the costs as to which the contest was sustained and such deposit or
security shall have the effect of meeting all time requirements for the
posting of appeal bond.
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(c) Review.
If a court sustains a contest for reasons of substance, or dismisses an
appeal or writ of error on account of the insufficiency of an inability
affidavit, the injured party may file with the clerk of the court which has
jurisdiction for review over that court an affidavit of inability to pay costs
in accordance with Section (a) of this Rule, together with a copy of the
affidavit below, the contest below, and the order thereupon, and shall de-
liver a complete copy in accordance with the provisions of Rule 72 to all
persons who contested the affidavit below; whereupon the reviewing court
shall consider de novo the inability affidavit therein and any contest filed
in said reviewing court, and may enter an appropriate order. In the event
the affidavit reviewed is an affidavit for appeal, and the court allows such
appeal upon said affidavit, the clerk below and court reporter below shall
prepare the transcript and statement of facts in accordance with the Rules
of Civil Procedure but without the necessity for further order under
Rule 380.
SUGGESTED AMENDMENTS TO OTHER RULES
Rule 126. Strike the last sentence.
Rule 333. Amend Rule to read, "The provisions of Rule 145 shall like-
wise apply to appeals under this section."
Rule 355. Amend to read, "The provisions of Rule 145 shall apply to
the Courts of Civil Appeals."
Rule 356. Strike paragraph (b). In the next to last sentence, substitute
"All procedure concerning," in place of "Contest of."
Rule 444. Repeal. (Covered by Rules 145, 355.)
Rule 485. In last sentence substitute, "All procedure concerning," in
place of, "Contest of;" substitute "Rule 145" in place of "Rule 355."
Rule 508. Repeal. (Covered by Rule 145.)
Rule 572. Amend to read, "The provisions of Rule 145 shall apply to the
justice court."
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